July 3 was one month prior to the nuclear bomb dropping. By that time, B-29 bombing raids with conventional bombs had been operating since 1944. Further, the fact that they had to order it to be preserved on July 3 implies that it hadn't been saved until that point. So, Hiroshima was saved for a month, but only after it had been an equally viable target for the prior several months to a year.

Crossover from the other front page article. I tested out ChatGPT5 search mode and there are some good sources!

https://chatgpt.com/s/t_68bd82908c0c8191b142b860ff91c9dc

Amazing book

The last coup was quite a stretch. They hoped to stop the surrender by stopping the Emperor's message from being broadcast. Crazy.

I suppose there were some coups that succeeded because the plotters controlled the news media.

I think it's hard for people to fathom how hellbent the Japanese were at the time.

Even _after_ the emperor asked to, it was not smooth sailing.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ky%C5%ABj%C5%8D_incident

Manchuria was across the Sea of Japan from the Japanese home islands. The Soviet invasion of Manchuria did nothing substantive to directly threaten Japan.

Japanese strategists wanted to be in Manchuria and Korea because of their proximity to imperial Japan, but that was also why they had invaded the Philippines (to defend seaborne lines of communication to their oil supplies in Borneo).

By the time the Soviets invaded, the Japanese had been ejected from much of their outlying empire, yet they had not surrendered, because Japan itself had the capability to fight.

The Soviet invasion of Manchuria did not change that, an invasion of Japan proper could only have come with involvement from the rest of the allies, including the sealift used for the invasions of Normandy and southern France.

> Didn't the Soviet invasion of Manchuria also boxed them in? Some Historians(Paul Hamn for once) have said that was the primary reason for the surrender.

The Japanese were already expecting a Soviet attack: the only 'unexpected' thing about what the Soviets did was make a move in Summer 1945 instead of Spring 1946.

But the Japanese knew what was going to happen eventually.

Oh, yes - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_invasion_of_Manchuria

From the Japanese PoV, imagining that they could hold off the US/UK suddenly ceased to matter. Obviously Japanese armies could not stand against Soviet armies. So - "OMG, who could have imagined the Americans inventing a super-super-duper bomb! I guess we'll have to surrender to them" was a face-saving way to avoid a quick & brutal Soviet conquest & occupation.

I agree the outcome was clear. And this was a feudal system with an Emperor, and a culture of extreme adherence to culture.

As in, Kamikazis because ordered, honour in death, or killing yourself with your own sword. Not really a culture of capitulation. Most of their cities were already firebombed, as you elude to, some more than once, yet there was still no surrender.

Without surrender, a country isn't really done. Leave it be, and they'll arm and rebuild, still at war with you. Invade, and your troops die, for a standing army still existed. Japan also had colonies, islands, resources.

And of course without surrender, even if you occupy, now you have insurgents.

It's hard to view the world through the eyes of even 80 years ago.

War weary, endless soldiers lost already, an unsurrendering Japan, and a way to put an end to it...

Two history books, "Code-Name Downfall" by Allen and "Downfall" by Frank point out that the Japanese high command was horrified by the effects of the nuclear bombs, cared a great deal about the loss of life, and were highly concerned that the next target would be Tokyo.

So they chose to end it.

There's a fair amount of detail and references in those books if one wishes to dig into it.

(I say they are "history" books as opposed to "activist" books. The latter are not worth reading.)

Some material I've seen claimed that the Japanese leadership didn't know it was a nuclear bomb. The Japanese knew immediately it was nuclear bomb, because they had a nuclear bomb development program themselves.

Massive scale strategic bombing and nuclear weapons are not substitutable from a military strategy standpoint and everyone would have understood the implications of that. Any similarity is superficial.

The massive bombing of Japan was a grinding war of attrition that has well-understood limitations and challenges. Military leaders in Japan were perfectly capable of understanding what those campaigns couldn't do, so it came down to a willingness to accept the losses to maintain strategic optionality, which they clearly were.

Most of the limitations of strategic bombing campaigns do not apply to nuclear weapons, which is something the Japanese military leadership also understood, though the scope of capability was uncertain (which also probably helped). If the US switched to nuclear weapons instead of conventional bombing campaigns, which was the risk Japanese military leaders had to consider, it takes most of the strategic optionality off the table at which point there is little to gain by continuing.

I think there was also the shock effect of this one tiny bomb with that much power. And the Japanese didn't know that America only had those two available. They could have had thousands for all they knew.

And this is also something that could strike their leadership. You can build bunkers against conventional bombs but for nuclear that's a different ball game

> "Whether the Japanese surrendered when they did or surrendered a couple months later, though, Japanese surrender was largely expected at that point."

By whom? In actuality, both the US and Japan were planning for a long campaign on the Japanese home islands: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Downfall. The Japanese intended to prolong fighting as much as possible to force the US to abandon the invasion because of mounting costs and casualties.

Even the night before the surrender, some among the Japanese military attempted a coup to prevent it and continue the war: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ky%C5%ABj%C5%8D_incident

Your understanding is incorrect. Even with the atomic bombs and the Soviet entered to the war, the cabinet still split about surrendering.

Before that The Japanese had started to talk about a cease-fire, but that cease-fire was expected to include ongoing control of China, Korea, and some of the islands they had taken in the war. In other words it wasn’t a surrender, but rather a let us keep these last little bit bits and maybe we won’t kill you. It was delusional to the extreme.

The debate in Washington at this point not if Japan would be invaded or not or would surrender.

Operations downfall and Olympus were planned. They were projecting anywhere from hundreds of thousands to 1 million casualties on the US side. No one bothered to do the calculation on the Japanese side, but the Japanese leadership believed that their path of victory was to make it prohibitively expensive in American lives to take the islands and they didn’t care how many Japanese died. You can take a look at the ratios of Japanese dead to American dead on Iwo Jima, the Philippines to get an idea of the bloodbath that that would’ve been.

Of course, some Americans were seeing that the Japanese were far stronger on the islands and they anticipated. And we’re pushing for a total naval blockade instead. Japan’s economy and agricultural harvest had already collapsed. A total net naval blockade would’ve killed millions.

If atomic bombs never developed past what they dropped in Japan it's somewhat likely be used in war commonly. They are large and nasty, yet still require a lot of them for metropolitan areas.

It's the civilization enders we developed in the 30 years after that woke us up.

> Significant portion of the field of history is speculation and reading between the lines.

Government decisions and policies, especially in more modern times, runs on memos. If such options were discussed between departments there would be paperwork.

Wow, I didn't know that. I always assumed that there was only one Transit van. It looks like both the American models and the European models were sold in the UK, with the European models being significantly smaller; is that right?

Opel - the fastest rust in Europe. The only decent one were the later runs of Insignia and we all joked that the whole project was a failure because you could expect for the car to work straight out of the factory.

Opel is Stellantis which despite being headquartered in the Netherland for tax purposes is controlled by Americans, French, and Italians.

There are no Germans on the board or in executive positions.

I can remember back when most NZ tradies were happy with a Mitsubishi L300 or Toyota Hiace van that were smaller than a Ford Transit.

> And pick-ups are very unpopular here, unless you're a farmer there's no point in such a large open loading bed.

And even if you are a farmer, an american pick-up seems to be a rare choice around here. If you see something pick-up-like, it's usually more a variant of UniMog https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unimog .

And for the "small-time farmer without enough money to buy lots of equipment" (rare nowadays), tractors with tons of included functions were often more practical: https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fendt_GT (no english version, sorry). Since Germany is more dense and distances are smaller, low speed is less of an issue I guess, compared to the US. And you can pull real farm equipment, which a pick-up car usually cannot.

That's a lot of hyped up delusions in one post. And so many people think only the right wing lives in a media bubble.

If the estimated unit cost of ~90-110 million dollars is right, I'd argue it's a pretty big success. The absolute cheapest 4th generation fighter would cost you an order of 20-30 million dollars to import brand-new, whereas 4.5th generation platforms like the Rafale commonly fetch 100m+ a unit to import.

As far as credible 5th generation strike fighters go, that's a pretty cheap per-squadron price tag. My bigger gripe is with the "Big Bomb Diplomacy" tactics that require such a platform, but we'd end up wanting one either way if a fight with China is in the cards.

This is an incredible misunderstanding of WW1.

While there were some generals that were a bit too resistant to changing strategy when it might have seemed reasonable, the fact of the matter is, is that this was the 1910s.

Everyone was trying to solve the problem of trying to figure out how to fight, and no one could keep up with how fast warfare was changing. Armchair generals watching people die in almost real time from drone footage in Europe did not exist in 1915.

> Maybe the Americans were better

Belleau wood is the “chocolate box” of the US army.

> I heard that Pershing refused to follow British and French tactics.

Yeah, “these guys being at it for 4 years don't understand anything, let's show them how to do it” – proceed to get decimated in a couple days.

"Donkeys leading lions" was a myth.

https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/were-british-first-world-war-...

That WW1 is special is mostly a myth.

The reason we have this view of WW1 is that after WW1 in the 20s many normal people in the 20s started writing about the horrors of war and that combined with the strong anti-war sentiment lead to the view we have now. Claiming that generals like Haig was an incompetent butcher. The whole 'lions led by donkeys' myth.

However non of that is actually true. Or not anymore true then in any other war. For example, there is stark contrast to right after the war, where Haig was considered a hero and most soldiers in their post-WW1 writing liked him.

In terms of causality rates, WW1 isn't that special, high intensity combat in modern war isn't that different, from Crimea to WW2. If you have warfare at that level, even if you are successful, you have massive causalities. The Somme for example wasn't that different from the Normandy campaign in WW2.

These generals had to deal with armies of literally million of people and they didn't even have wireless communications. How do you command 500 men in a coordinated attack without communication?

The Americans had to go threw the same learning curve as the others, but they started right away fighting against an enemy that was mostly veterans. Americans could have learned better, but it also has to be said that Pershing by command from the president was not allowed to fully integrate his troupes with that of the French army.

> I assume that this was because many generals were trained on Napoleonic-Era tactics

This is complete and utter nonsense. Please stop spreading these myths. This all just Post-WW1 anti-war politics propaganda.

> against machine guns and semiauto rifles

This is again a myth. Semiauto rifles practically didn't exist in the beginning of WW1. And machine guns had existed for a while and were not that effective.

The big killer on the battle field is the fast shooting artillery. Massive innovations in that had happened in the 30 years before WW1.

Part of the problem was that the US Civil War was derided as a second-rate war in a colonial country. It demonstrated the power of the defence over the offence, and the sheer magnitude of war that an industrialized nation could create. Most people figured WW I would have ended by Christmas. Oops.