_verandaguy
2 days ago
Hello! I've got experience working on censorship circumvention for a major VPN provider (in the early 2020s).
- First things first, you have to get your hands on actual VPN software and configs. Many providers who are aware of VPN censorship and cater to these locales distribute their VPNs through hard-to-block channels and in obfuscated packages. S3 is a popular option but by no means the only one, and some VPN providers partner with local orgs who can figure out the safest and most efficient ways to distribute a VPN package in countries at risk of censorship or undergoing censorship.
- Once you've got the software, you should try to use it with an obfuscation layer.
Obfs4proxy is a popular tool here, and relies on a pre-shared key to make traffic look like nothing special. IIRC it also hides the VPN handshake. This isn't a perfectly secure model, but it's good enough to defeat most DPI setups.
Another option is Shapeshifter, from Operator (https://github.com/OperatorFoundation). Or, in general, anything that uses pluggable transports. While it's a niche technology, it's quite useful in your case.
In both cases, the VPN provider must provide support for these protocols.
- The toughest step long term is not getting caught using a VPN. By its nature, long-term statistical analysis will often reveal a VPN connection regardless of obfuscation and masking (and this approach can be cheaper to support than DPI by a state actor). I don't know the situation on the ground in Indonesia, so I won't speculate about what the best way to avoid this would be, long-term.
I will endorse Mullvad as a trustworthy and technically competent VPN provider in this niche (n.b., I do not work for them, nor have I worked for them; they were a competitor to my employer and we always respected their approach to the space).
teeray
2 days ago
> First things first, you have to get your hands on actual VPN software and configs.
It would be nice if one of the big shortwave operators could datacast these packages to the world as a public service.
ianburrell
a day ago
There isn't enough bandwidth in HF to transmit data. Digital HF audio is 20 kHz wide so maybe 50kbps. The entire HF band is only 3-30 MHz.
tzs
a day ago
50 kb/s x 1000 bits/kb x 3600 s/hr x 24 hr/day x 1 byte/8 bits x 1 MB / 1000000 bytes = 540 MB/day. That's enough to download VPN software and a Linux distribution to run it on in a day.
If you've already got a Linux system, the Debian openvpn package is under 1 MB and at 50 kb/s would take under 3 minutes to download. I don't know if openvpn in particular is suitable for people who are trying to evade their government, but would whatever features it is missing add substantially more size?
mrdomino-
a day ago
Yeah, you could use forward error correction too, so any n bits would be enough to reconstruct the input.
Of course then you get into needing software to decode the more advanced encodings; maybe start with a voice transmission explaining in plain language how to decode the first layer, which gives you a program that can decode the second layer, or something.
Starting to sound like an interesting project.
jdkdbrnrnrb
a day ago
You never used dialup did you?
anonzzzies
a day ago
300 baud. Was enough to download grainy porn pics. With a proper download tool that continues after hangups etc you can just leave it on for a week and I have when downloading software end 70s. No problem. Also via the airwaves: we had software via the radio every sunday. Works fine. Modern software is shitty large: it would be nice if a VPN provider would just release the driver and a cli which should not weigh over a mega (far less but outside mr Whitney i am not sure if that type of software dev still exists) for this type of transfer.
tzs
13 hours ago
9600 bps dialup using the protocols commonly used back then such as ZMODEM could do file transfers at 3 MB/hour. That would be fine for grabbing VPN software.
kingforaday
a day ago
zmodem to the rescue!
jchook
a day ago
Wireguard ships with the Linux kernel so you only need to receive ~60 bytes of configuration information.
teiferer
a day ago
The user-facing software is not included in the kernel, but you need that to configure wireguard.
jchook
a day ago
Is that true? I thought wg-quick etc were just convenience functions and that it's relatively trivial to use iproute2 to configure a VPN link
immibis
18 hours ago
Wireguard is also easily censored and is already censored in the places that censor VPNs.
zack6849
a day ago
sure there is, you can send files over HF, it may not be FAST, but once you get it into the country, you can just copy the file with a faster method (eg: usb drive), WINLINK supports attachments, so you could absolutely send these files over HF
smallnamespace
a day ago
If you're going to be using USB drives anyway, then using them to move files into the country would be faster.
nine_k
a day ago
More dangerous though. You'd need something like truecrypt, too.
youainti
a day ago
btw, veracrypt is the name if the follow up project. truecrypt shut down over a decade ago rather abruptly, so anything labeled truecrypt today is suspect as either out of date or potential malware.
cheeseomlit
19 hours ago
Wasn't the conspiracy theory that truecrypt got shut down because it was 'too effective', and the successor projects presumably have intentional backdoors or something?
estimator7292
a day ago
Nah, just drop a few thousand 1GB flash drives from a plane. Load them with a tor browser, a wireguard client, and instructions on finding a remote exit. Only one copy needs to survive and it can spread very quickly and irreversibly by foot.
ZaoLahma
a day ago
Yeah, this is a great approach if you're already at war with a country.
If you're not and they're still allowing your planes to fly through their airspace then this is a great way to ensure that they lock your (and your friends') planes out.
GJim
a day ago
Plugging in a strange USB drive?
What could go wrong.
ForOldHack
21 hours ago
Would you like a short list, a long list or ...
GoblinSlayer
a day ago
Or just google drive.
pythonguython
14 hours ago
I’m not familiar with any HF comms channels other than military or broadcasting that get 20 kHz of bandwidth. Most HF modes get 3 kHz. You might be able to get 5 kbps at 3 kHz BW with some modern modes that can adapt to the frequency selective non stationary channel.
transcriptase
a day ago
Wait until you find out what people used to do with phone lines!
mfiro
a day ago
The problem is the countries, which censor Internet and block VPNs, also jam shortwave radio signals.
godelski
a day ago
It's possible but also difficult to jam radio. That's part of why programs like Radio Free Asia[0,1] exist. Even if you can't broadcast from inside a territory you can broadcast from outside. It can be jammed but it is a tough cat and mouse game and jamming isn't precise. So when you jam there are causalities. Not to mention that jamming can be quite expensive.
I'm not saying that makes the problem easy, but I'll say that jamming isn't a very strong defense.
Though the bigger issue here is probably bandwith. It's hard to be both long range and data dense. There's probably easier ways to distribute this. Hell, both Koreas are known to transport different things via balloons.
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radio_Free_Asia
[1] It is also why projects like Tor and Signal get funding from RFA. Maybe the US doesn't want encrypted services here, but if anything, it's for the same reason they do want encrypted services in other countries.
DrAwdeOccarim
a day ago
I’m not sure that’s super feasible any longer with the advent of cheap SDRs. Over-the-horizon HF broadcast can be heard with a simple speaker wire antenna inside your house. If anyone is interested in trying to deploy such an idea, I’d love to participate as an avid ham.
SahAssar
a day ago
Could I ask for a source on that and how common it is?
Seems like it was used way back in the cold war (and even then not blocked/jammed) and I'd guess that current authoritarian regimes would perhaps not bother considering how few could use it.
bragr
a day ago
Source: trust me bro, but you can find HF jamming pretty easily on Internet connected SDRs, especially near "sensitive" countries.
Marsymars
a day ago
The USSR had an extensive shortwave radio jamming program!
BoxOfRain
a day ago
The UK used to get around this with very powerful medium-wave signals, the site at Orfordness could put out the BBC World Service at 2 MW towards the USSR and the Eastern Bloc. This site was built on the remains of a 1960s UK/US over-the-horizon radar installation that never worked properly.
These broadcasts were shut down in the early '10s but ironically one of the masts is still in use by Radio Caroline, the former pirate who broke the BBC's radio monopoly by putting their station just outside of UK territorial waters. Their 4 kW goes pretty far given the site's previous role, heard them as far away as the Lake District.
spwa4
a day ago
... to block BBC and Voice of America, RFE and RL.
But they recently switched to a much cheaper and more effective jamming program: Trump [1].
[1] https://apnews.com/article/voa-radio-trump-media-cuts-5f87df...
asimovfan
a day ago
if it became a widespread practice, wouldnt even the countries that yet dont do it probably start doing it?
hattmall
a day ago
But then couldn't the authorities just intercept it too and then block those ips?
downrightmike
a day ago
NamTaf
a day ago
Streisand is extremely out of date and wouldn’t last long in China, but I don’t know how sophisticated Indonesia’s firewall is
fsckboy
a day ago
i have a few chinese friends and they say it's always easy to get a working vpn. that might not be true in a Tien An Minh type crisis, i dunno, but month in month out year upon year they surf western sites, exchange winnie the pooh pictures, etc. i suppose the people i know could be relatively upper class, i have no idea what type difference that could make. i had a chinese gf in LA who would send... my >cough< pictures... to her mother in china because she enjoyed them
ivanstepanovftw
a day ago
This is no 'nothing special' with Obfs4proxy. DPI sees it as random byte stream, thus your government can decide to block unknown protocols. Instead, you should trick DPI into thinking it sees HTTPS. Unless your government decides to block HTTPS.
verandaguy
a day ago
Hi, posting from my main account (I'm also the poster of the GP comment).
"Nothing special" in this case was meant to describe the fact that it's random data with no identifiable patterns inherent to the data; you're absolutely right that that's what obfs4 does. I understand the confusion though, this phrasing could be better.
> your government can decide to block unknown protocols
This does happen, though when I worked in the industry it wasn't common. Blocking of specific protocols was much more of an obstacle. > you should trick DPI into thinking it sees HTTPS. Unless your government decides to block HTTPS
HTTPS blocking (typically based on either the presence of a specific SNI field value, or based on the use of the ESNI/ECH TLS extension) was prolific. I won't comment on whether this was effective or not in impeding efforts to get people in these places connected.I will say though, Operator's Replicant does something similar to what you're describing in that it can mimic unrelated protocols. It's a clever approach, unfortunately it was a bit immature when I was working in that area so the team didn't adopt it while I was around.
rafram
a day ago
> your government can decide to block unknown protocols
Has any government ever done that? Seems like it would just break everything (because the world is full of devices that use custom protocols!) at great computational expense.
thenthenthen
a day ago
China blocked https last week: https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/cyber-security/ch...
Discussion: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=44958621
rafram
a day ago
They blanket blocked connections to port 443 for an hour. There was no protocol sniffing.
ivanstepanovftw
12 hours ago
Russia tested this in production by blocking Shadowsocks https://habr.com/ru/news/770840/
conradev
a day ago
WebRTC is another great option: https://snowflake.torproject.org
It's used for a lot of legitimate traffic as well, so a bit harder to block.
commandersaki
a day ago
The only VPN technology I see that blends as HTTPS is MASQUE IP Proxying, and the only implementation I know that does this is iCloud Private Relay. It is also trivial to block because blocking 443/udp doesn't really affect accessing the Internet.
artdigital
a day ago
Cloudflare WARP (1.1.1.1 tunnel or Zero Trust) run by default on MASQUE
commandersaki
a day ago
Ah that's true, they originally started off with a rust implementation of Wireguard but have since moved to MASQUE.
drdaeman
a day ago
Not the only, AFAIK Shadowsocks with xray-core can pretend to be a 443/tcp HTTPS server.
commandersaki
11 hours ago
Thanks for this, really couldn't find any English explanation of xray-core though.
tiberious726
a day ago
Exactly this. Hell, for OP's use case of accessing things like twitter, a good old fashioned https proxy would be entirely fine, and likely not even illegal.
sim7c00
a day ago
what i was thinking. DPI might pick up on proxy headers. alternatively, idk how far one would get just slapping wireguard or openvpn on a VPS somewhere on port 443. that used to work fairly well but i suppose my experience there is like 10+ years out of date by now.
i know a US based tech firm i worked for around 2020 had a simple HTTPS proxy for chinese clients to download content updates. worked really well. it was hosted on some cloud provider and accessible via DNS name. so its not like it wasn't easy to block it. they just didn't bother or it was lost in a sea of other similar activities.
that all being said, regarding oppressive regimes and political turmoil situations: if your health or freedom is at risk, don't rely on internet people's 'guesswork' (hard to tell where ppl get their info from, and what its based on etc.). be careful. if you are not confident, don't go forward with it. Try to get advice from local experts instead, who are familiar in the specific context you are dealing with.
mrs6969
a day ago
How can you do that exactly ?
userbinator
a day ago
Unless your government decides to block HTTPS.
In which case you use stenography, but I believe even the Great Firewall of China doesn't block HTTPS completely.
verandaguy
a day ago
Nit: you likely mean steganography, stenography is what court reporters do :)
I encourage you and anyone else here to read into the GFW if you're interested. It's more like the Great Firewalls -- there's regional fragmentation with different vendors, operators, implementations and rules between different parts of the country.
Predictably this means there's no one-size-fits-all solution to circumventing censorship on the Chinese internet, and research into this area's difficult since China has both the technical means to identify violations very efficiently as well as the bureaucratic infrastructure to carry out enforcement actions against a considerable portion of those people who violate the GFW rules (with enforcement action being anything from a "cooldown period" on your internet connection where you can't make any connections for some amount of time between minutes and days, fines, or imprisonment depending on the type of content you were trying to access).
So, the ethics of digging into this get very muddy, very fast.
widforss
a day ago
azalemeth
2 days ago
Thank you very much for a detailed answer. Might I rudely ask -- as you're knowledgeable in this space, what do you think of Mullvad's DAITA, which specifically aims to defeat traffic analysis by moving to a more pulsed constant bandwidth model?
_verandaguy
2 days ago
DAITA was introduced after my time in the industry, but this isn't a new idea (though as far as I know, it's the first time this kind of thing's been commercialized).
It's clever. It tries to defeat attacks against one of the tougher parts of VPN connections to reliably obfuscate, and the effort's commendable, but I'll stop short of saying it's a good solution for one big reason: with VPNs and censorship circumvention, the data often speaks for itself.
A VPN provider working in this space will often have aggregate (and obviously anonymized, if they're working in good faith) stats about success rates and failure classes encountered from clients connecting to their nodes. Where I worked, we didn't publish this information. I'm not sure where Mullvad stands on this right now.
In any case -- some VPN providers deploying new technology like this will partner with the research community (because there's a small, but passionate formal research community in this space!) and publish papers, studies, and other digests of their findings. Keep an eye out for this sort of stuff. UMD's Breakerspace in the US in particular had some extremely clever people working on this stuff when I was involved in the industry.
zelphirkalt
a day ago
If you are on a limited data plan, beware, DAITA produces a lot of traffic.
pipes
a day ago
Thanks for this, UK citizen/subject here I believe the UK government is likely to go down the path of banning vpns.
laylower
a day ago
Can someone competent pull together a manual to set a vpn with obfuscation? I am sure it will be well received.
A github repo would be ideal really
jijijijij
14 hours ago
Not competent, but a VPN user. Mullvad has some obfuscation features built-in. They also got good documentation/guides, I think.
https://mullvad.net/en/help?Feature=censorship-circumvention
https://web.archive.org/web/20250807131341/https://mullvad.n...
Cypher
a day ago
gotta go underground, freedom is now an enemy of the crown.
ethbr1
a day ago
T minus not much until UK punk revival
belter
a day ago
It will be done very soon....
"Dame Rachel told BBC Newsnight: "Of course, we need age verification on VPNs - it's absolutely a loophole that needs closing and that's one of my major recommendations." - https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn438z3ejxyo
They phrase it as age verification, but what they mean is the VPN provider needs to provide them the client list...
kilroy123
a day ago
ISPs here are already blocking popular ones.
extraisland
a day ago
No they are not. It is being talked about adding age-gating to the VPNs.
andy_ppp
a day ago
In the UK? That’s insane
juntoalaluna
a day ago
Its also not true.
myshoemouth
2 days ago
I'm curious. How does a state actor do actual DPI without pushing certs to end user devices?
teraflop
a day ago
The "inspection" part of DPI isn't limited to encrypted payloads. It's straightforward enough to look at application-level protocol headers and identify e.g. a Wireguard or OpenVPN or SSH connection, even if you can't decrypt the payload. That could be used as sufficient grounds to either block the traffic or punish the user.
mr_mitm
a day ago
I thought OpenVPN simply opens a TLS encrypted connection. How does it look different than HTTPS?
orthoxerox
a day ago
Pushing certs to end user devices is simple. First you create your own national CA. Then you make all government services use TLS certificates signed by the national CA. Then you make phone vendors preinstall the root cert of the national CA into the trust store if they want to sell them in your country. Then you make your ISPs buy and install MITM appliances.
mrbluecoat
a day ago
Network fingerprinting, like https://github.com/FoxIO-LLC/ja4
oasisbob
a day ago
DPI refers to a broad class of products which attempt to find signals and categorize traffic according to a ruleset, either to block it or throttle the speeds, etc.
While access to plaintext is useful, it's not required for other rules which are eg looking at the timing and frequency of packets.
dev_l1x_be
a day ago
Because you are leaking information left and right with TCP / DNS and all these basic protocols that powering the internet today. When these were designed people were happy that it worked at all and nobody really tought that it should be state actor proof. Except maybe DJB. https://www.curvecp.org/
trod1234
a day ago
There are a couple of ways.
The main one is called an Eclipse Attack in cyber circles, and it can be done at any entity operating at the ASN layer so long as they can position themselves to relay your traffic.
The adversary can invisibly (to victim PoV) modify traffic if they have a cooperating rootPKI cert (anywhere in the ecosystem) that isn't the originating content provider, so long as they recognize the network signature (connection handshake); solely by terminating encryption early.
Without a cert, you can still listen in with traffic analysis, the fetched traffic that's already been encrypted with their key (bit for bit), as known plaintext the math quickly reduces. SNI and a few other artifacts referencing the resources/sites are not part of the encrypted payload.
Its more commonly known in a crypto context, but that kind of attack can happen anywhere. It even works against TOR. One of the first instances (afaik) was disclosed by Princeton researches in 2015, under the Raptor paper.
EE84M3i
a day ago
I've studied and worked in computer security for over a decade and have never heard of an "eclipse attack" before. Is this blockchain specific terminology? It seems like an adversarial network partition?
codethief
a day ago
> It seems like an adversarial network partition
plus an MITM attack, if I understand correctly.
trod1234
a day ago
I've been a SA Generalist for a decade, primarily in biopharma. This is the terminology the people I worked alongside used which included both Network and Computer Engineers.
It was explained to me that its just another version of MITM, the only difference is the number of resilient paths that need to be compromised. Eclipse type of attacks focus on compromising multiple nodes and most deal with breaking consensus algorithmic based software, which is quite common of blockchain, but that isn't the only place.
TL;DR In a single path graph you have MITM, in a N-path graph of connectivity you have Eclipse. Two heads of the same coin.
Loosely I guess it would be considered an adversarial network partition at the ASN/BGP level. For active attacks you'd have to broadcast improperly, but for regional attacks at the ASN level you just have to be positioned correctly passively. That's why the whole AT&T room for the NSA back in the day was such a big deal. A lot of these attacks have been known about for a long time.
For instance, the same kind of attack could easily be done by compromising firmware within 1-step away from edge devices (Modems/Routers/ISP TFTP servers).
Quite a lot of what was in the nationstate war-chest 10 years ago has been leaked, and is actively being used by non-state actors at this point.
Its mad how sophisticated things are now. On some campuses, its not unheard of to see drones flying by to hack the radio logitech keyboards of campus computers; where they try to drop malware OTA through a powershell or tty keyboard spawned terminal prompt. Crazy stuff.
darkwater
a day ago
> Its mad how sophisticated things are now. On some campuses, its not unheard of to see drones flying by to hack the radio logitech keyboards of campus computers; where they try to drop malware OTA through a powershell or tty keyboard spawned terminal prompt. Crazy stuff.
This is actually crazy indeed. At least you can still use corded keyboards or BT ones (until the day there is some 0-day on BT pairing...)
unethical_ban
a day ago
Patterns of data transmission (network behavioral analysis, I just made that term up), analyzing IP and ports, inspecting SSL handshakes for destination site. In short, metadata.
77pt77
a day ago
Obfs4proxy and Shapeshifter are an absolute PITA to install.
Get your own VPS server (VPS in EU/US with 2GB of ram, 40GB of disk space and TBs/month of traffic go for $10 a year, it's that cheap). Never get anything in the UK and even USA is weird. I'd stick with EU.
Install your software (wireguard + obsfuscation or even tailscale with your own DERP server)
Another simpler alternative is just `ssh -D port` and use it as a SOCKS server. It's usually not blocked but very obvious.
mrb
a day ago
In my experience, in China as of 2016, "ssh -D" vasn't reliable at all, I wrote more details at https://blog.zorinaq.com/my-experience-with-the-great-firewa... (see "idea 1")
jquery
a day ago
I just spent 3 months in China this summer. The GFW has become much more sophisticated than I remember. I found only one method that reliably worked. That was to use Holafly (an international eSIM provider) and use its built-in VPN. China largely doesn’t care if foreigners get around the GFW, I guess.
Another method that usually worked was ProtonVPN with protocol set to Wireguard. Not sure why this worked, it’s definitely a lot more detectable than other methods I tried. But as long as I rotated which US server I used every few days, this worked fine.
No luck with shadowsocks, ProtonVPN “stealth” mode, Outline+Digital Ocean, or even Jump / Remote Desktop. Jump worked the longest at several hours before it became unbearably slow, I’m still not sure if I was actually throttled or my home computer started misbehaving.
I didn’t get around to setting up a pure TLS proxy, or proxying traffic through a domain that serves “legitimate” traffic, so no idea if that still works.
edm0nd
a day ago
Holafly (and other "travel" eSim providers) have been caught routing traffic through China.
https://www.itnews.com.au/news/travel-esims-secretly-route-t...
jiggawatts
a day ago
That article seems bogus.
IP blocks are routinely bought and sold, and hence their geo location database entries are not reliable.
If you’re physically in the EU or the UK and your traffic is routed through China it would be unusably slow and immediately noticeable to non-technical users.
thenthenthen
a day ago
Exclusively use Shadowsocks here in the mainland. Was surprised to see Ngrok to work as well, but prolly not very long/reliable.
ghoshbishakh
19 hours ago
It is a tunnel, cant be used to browse a site through it isn't it?
77pt77
15 hours ago
If you have a working tunnel the rest is trivial.
77pt77
a day ago
Regarding your usage:
Organic Maps app can download all maps for offile and works OK in China.
It uses openstreetmap data.
1024 bit RSA keys is laughable. I'm inclined to think this was not by accident.
Idea 1 and 2 are basically the same.
extraduder_ire
a day ago
Where are you finding a VPS in the EU for $10/year? Any I've seen are about 5-6 times that much.
danielhep
a day ago
Check LowEndTalk and LowEndBox
dannyobrien
a day ago
Can recommend. Always a little crazy, always insanely cheap. If it doesn't work out, you can just switch to another provider.
77pt77
a day ago
https://billing.chunkserve.com/cart.php?a=confproduct&i=0
https://my.servitro.com/cart.php?a=view
https://manager.ouiheberg.com/cart.php?a=confproduct&i=0
1GB or even 512MB and 10GB of storage is very easy and completely doable to use for a VPN + HTTPS server
Traffic is super cheap nowadays.
Your real issue will be IP reputation.
https://lowendtalk.com/categories/offers
Is a good source.
kijin
a day ago
Which countries you need to avoid depends on your threat model. For example, there is need to avoid the USA if all you're trying to do is bypass the Chinese firewall. There might even be a legitimate use case for pretending to have a UK IP address.
Since OP is in Southeast Asia, a VPS in JP or SG will probably hit a decent balance between latency and censorship avoidance.
btown
2 days ago
This makes me wonder: are there "cloud drive virtual sneakernet" systems that will communicate e.g. by a client uploading URL request(s) as documents via OneDrive/SharePoint/Google Drive/Baidu etc., a server reacting to this via webhook and uploading (say) a PDF version of the rendered site, then allowing the client to download that PDF? You effectively use the CDN of that service as a (very slow) proxy.
Of course, https://xkcd.com/538/ applies in full force, and I don't have any background in the space to make this a recommendation!
jack_pp
2 days ago
It doesn't apply imo as OP is probably not a high value target of the govt, he just wants to bypass his govt restrictions and I doubt the situation is so bad that the govt will send people physically to deal with people circumventing the block.
Your solution could technically work over any kind of open connection / data transfer protocol that isn't blocked by the provider but it would be an absolute pain to browse the web that way and there are probably better solutions out there.
cluckindan
a day ago
How about IPv6 over S3?
mulchpower
a day ago
There are some techniques like fragmented TLS and reordered packets that work in some cases. Also using vanilla HTTPS transport is a good start for many places. URnetwork is an open source, decentralized option that does all of these out of the box. You can get it on the major stores or F-Droid.
lossolo
a day ago
Mullvad is a bad choice for this particular case because they publish all their IPs, which makes them very easy to block. You should look into VPN providers that do not publish their IPs and that have a wide range of IP classes and multiple ASNs, which look like ordinary networks not associated with VPNs. In my experience, NordVPN and ExpressVPN have many of these.
thenthenthen
a day ago
Express and Nord are completely useless in China. Mullvad worked fine two years ago but is getting worse, not sure if it still works currently.
exe34
2 days ago
I wonder if it can be embedded in a video stream, like a video of a lava lamp that you always have open, but the lsb of ever byte is meaningful.
_verandaguy
2 days ago
That's an interesting idea, and probably something you might be able to achieve with a tool like h26forge.
It's also probably more useful to just have a connection be fully dedicated to a VPN, and have the traffic volume over time mimic what you'd see in a video, rather than embedding it in a video -- thanks to letsencrypt, much of the web's served over TLS these days (asterisks for countries like KZ and TM which force the use of a state-sponsored CA), so going to great lengths to embed your VPN in a video isn't really practical.
hsbauauvhabzb
2 days ago
I’m curious about what makes it difficult to block a vpn provider long term. You said getting the software is difficult, but can a country not block known vpn ingress points?
_verandaguy
2 days ago
A country can and absolutely will block known VPN ingress points. There are two tricks that we can use to circumvent this:
- Host on a piece of infrastructure that's so big that you can't effectively block it without causing a major internet outage (think: S3, Cloudflare R2, etc). Bonus points if you can leverage something like ECH (ex-ESNI) to make it harder to identify a single bucket or subdomain.
- Keep spawning new domains and subdomains to distribute your binaries.
There are complications with both approaches. Some countries block ECH outright. Some have no problem shutting the internet down wholesale for a little bit. The domain-hopping approach presents challenges w/r/t establishing trust (though not insurmountable ones, much of the time).
These are thing that have to be judged and balanced on a case-by-case basis, and having partners on the ground in these places really helps reduce risk to users trying to connect from these places, but then you have to be very careful talking to then since they could themselves get in trouble for trying to organize a VPN distribution network with you. It's layers on layers, and at some point it helps to just have someone on the team with a background in working with people in vulnerable sectors and someone else from a global affairs and policy background to try and keep things as safe as they can be for people living under these regimes.
geokon
a day ago
you can also throttle
for instance AWS hosted things in China are typically just severly throttled and flaky. Github is the best example. it works but webpage assets often either dont load or load incredibly slowly. this pushes people to local services without breaking the web entirely
shawa_a_a
2 days ago
I've heard of domain fronting, where you host something on a subdomain of a large provider like Azure or Amazon. Is this what you're talking about when you say
> - Host on a piece of infrastructure that's so big that you can't effectively block it without causing a major internet outage (think: S3, Cloudflare R2, etc).
How can one bounce VPN traffic through S3? Or are you just talking about hosting client software, ingress IP address lists, etc?
_verandaguy
2 days ago
That's generally for distribution, but yeah, it's a form of domain fronting.
There are some more niche techniques that are _really_ cool but haven't gained widespread adoption, too, like refractive routing. The logistics of getting that working are particularly challenging since you need a willing partner who'll undermine some of their trustworthiness with some actors to support (what is, normally, to them) your project.
jart
a day ago
If I understand correctly, refractive routing basically just gets big trustworthy cloud providers to host the VPNs so that third world governments can't block them without blocking the cloud too. It's an unfortunate solution since tech platforms are international entities that should be neutral. When America asks them to take sides and prevent other countries from implementing their desired policies, America is spending the political capital and trust that tech companies worked hard to earn. It's also really foolish of those countries to just block things outright. They could probably achieve their policy goals simply by slowing down access to VPN endpoints.
incrediblesulk
a day ago
I thought a lot of the domain-fronting approaches have largely been closed from policy changes at major CDNs (e.g. https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/azurenetworkingblog...) . Or is it still possible through other approaches?
sterlind
a day ago
ECH (Encrypted Client Hello) brings back a kind of domain fronting, except you don't need to front anything at all. the Client Hello itself is encrypted, so the SNI is hidden.
hopefully ECH will catch on. I suspect the corporate backlash over domain fronting was them not wanting to be caught in the crossfire if their domain was used as a front. if e.g. Signal used "giphy.com" as a front, Russia might block giphy to block Signal. but if Signal is hosted on, say, AWS, and ECH was used, Russia would have no option other than blocking the entirety of AWS, since all TLS handshakes to AWS would look the same.
though cloud providers (other than CloudFlare, respect!) don't seem to care about censorship or surveillance anymore, and might decline to adopt ECH if some lucrative market complains.
hsbauauvhabzb
2 days ago
Sorry I’m referring to WireGuard/ovpn server IPs, not the binaries/configs used to setup a client. Unless you’re talking about fronting for both, but I imagine it is not economical to run a commercial -scale privacy vpn via a cloud provider.