> So if you happen to be able to make ␛]8;;https://example.com/"/...␇ appear in the job logs —4 which you can, either without even having an account, by sending a patch to a public mailing list with continuous integration turned on

The fact that this could be triggered so easily — just sending a malicious patch to a mailing list — is pretty insane.

Really commendable work fixing up the upstream python project. I don't think there's anything to be embarrassed about in the timeline.

Oh my God, it's OSC 8 again. Because copy-pasting an URI from the terminal window is so 2003, and goodness gracious, having to look at an actual URL instead of an arbitrarily inaccurate description of it? That's, like, 1993. When I wrote my variant of ansi2html, I aggressively stripped out every C0 and C1, and all of the possible APC/DCS/OSC/PM sequences.

Meanwhile, internal links between different parts of a man page still don't exist (unless you use GNU Info but seriously, I'd rather use lynx on a folder of HTML files instead).

Congrats on the write up, seems extremely serious, I hope Sourcehut and Drew paid you well for this.

haven’t been properly rickrolled in years, wasn’t expecting that!

Build logs are such a tricky attack surface; sanitizing arbitrary build output is practically impossible without breaking useful formatting. Always assume untrusted input.

nitpick: typo "Vulnerabile" :)

I love sourcehut, and I can't really think anything to replace it. But here's my shot. It's a popular myth that independently from the project size, someone should always take the main stream product in the field than small projects because most of the people would use the main stream product and there's an higher chance that vulnerabilities get already exploited/recognized/fixed. Is that true or not? TL;DR: in the evaluation of such products (sourcehut but even self hosted stuff), should we also take account about the project history and the exposition to threats?

HN hug of death, strikes again.