Planktonne
3 hours ago
Of course not. Because the article uses the words 'thought' and 'reasoning' and even 'faithful' to mean something other than their normal meanings, but then expects them to behave exactly the same.
Every field has terms of art, and 'reasoning' is one for LLMs. But that doesn't mean it has the same properties as 'reasoning' in other contexts, because you're not referring to the same thing.
Why doesn't my asteroid belt buckle?
stymaar
3 hours ago
Related: Stop Anthropomorphizing Intermediate Tokens as Reasoning/Thinking Traces![1]
> Our findings consistently challenge the prevailing narrative that intermediate tokens constitute a semantically meaningful reasoning process. First, we observe a pronounced lack of correlation between solution correctness and trace validity—models frequently produce invalid reasoning traces even when they arrive at correct solutions. Second, and more strikingly, models trained on corrupted or semantically irrelevant traces achieve performance comparable to, and often exceeding, that of models trained on correct traces, especially on out-of-distribution tasks.
Terr_
2 hours ago
Also posted to HN today with a couple comments: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49360140#49363374
porridgeraisin
2 hours ago
The author of this paper is in ASU and does a lot of excellent work in this space. People should check it out. Especially the paper titled "Beyond Semantics..." His twitter is also active _and_ high SNR.
Related: Poster side dialogue and Q&A about this work at ICML. Very good. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49277303
swatcoder
2 hours ago
Over time, I've learned to accept that many people -- even very clever ones -- are incapable of holding a metaphor at arm's length. Once they accept the words of a metaphor as applicable at all, the metaphor collapses entirely into literalism for them. They can no longer see that the metaphor was just a tool with inherent limitatation and boundaries.
Because the field of artificial "intelligence" is constructed around the idea of applying psychological metaphors to computational systems (a very powerful idea!) it's almost a worst case scenario for these people.
Suddenly, they're reversing the metaphors and applying computational schema to psychological processes ("aren't we really just stochastic parrots ourselves?!"); or, like here, they find themselves surprised and confused when they stumble across the natural boundaries of the metaphor experimentally.
It's because they never had sight of the boundaries in the first place and maybe never can quite see them. The words only make sense to them as literal equivalence, and so their surprise when they run into stuff like this is earnest and deep.
empath75
31 minutes ago
I don't think the boundary between "generalization" and "metaphor" is very well defined. When you go from an exemplar of 1 to 2, you're going to find all kinds of edge cases where attributes of the thing being demonstrated that had seemed to be essential turn out to not be necessary.
I think you certainly could look at LLMs as "thinking" metaphorically, but I also don't think it is necessarily only a metaphor.