> I have lost chat histories more times than I can remember, and I have to be extra diligent about this these days.

As per Signal’s diehard proponents, losing chat history is a feature, not a bug (I’m not being facetious when saying this, and you can see comments of this kind in Signal related threads here).

Edited to add: I don’t agree with that premise and have long disliked losing chat history.

This is a difference in the threat model.

Signal's threat model is that everything around you is hostile to you, except the parties you interact with. You are an undercover rebel in a totalitarian sect which would sacrifice you to Cthulhu if they see your chat history. Losing it is much better than disclosing it.

Your threat model is likely random black hat hackers who would try to get into your communication channels and dig some dirt to blackmail you, or to impersonate you to scam your grandmother out of several thousand dollars. Signal protects quite well against it. But the chance of this happening even in an unencrypted channel is low enough. You don't mind making the security posture somehow weaker, but preserve the possibility to restore your chat history if your secure device is lost or destroyed.

I suppose the problem could be solved by an encrypted backup with a long key which you keep on a piece of paper in your wallet, and / or in a bank in a safe deposit box. Ideally it would be in the format that the `age` utility supports.

But there is no way around that paper with the long code. If this code is stored on your device, and can be copied, it will be copied by some exploit. No matter how inconspicuous a backdoor you are making, somebody will find it and sneak into it. Should it happen in a publicized case, the public opinion will be "XYZ is insecure, run away from it!".

I set up automatic backups of WhatsApp to my self-hosted Nextcloud once. Since you need 'tested backups', I tried to decrypt these WhatsApp backups independent of my phone, but this was not possible. You need the original device. There are some hacks online, but they are always out of date.

I am tending now to running Mautrix Whatsapp bridge and backing up my data through this.

Apple/Google passkeys.

my proposal devices is like yubikey but instead of yubikey hardware in place like USB devices form

its in the form of ring or bracelet, its small enough and can be carried everywhere with you all the time

its use NFC like technology, it works without battery, fast and "secure enough" for 99% of people

what if the device is stolen???? we can add authorization like biometric (fingerprint etc) while touching devices so it can be sure the real owner is "giving" auth

"The most popular modern secure messaging tool is Signal"

As Mike Waltz had found out. And Snowden used gpg and I haven't heard of a single message of his having been decrypted.

Proton still appears to suffer from Lavabit's pathologies in several ways because it ultimately stores GPG private keys, hasn't had their "zero-access encryption" audited by an independent third-party, it hosts servers in privacy-hostile jurisdictions that can be seized, and they've already handed user data to authorities over 30k times. [0] Proton Mail is a simulacra of privacy as a service that lies to its customers.

At present time, the best way to assure privacy is to lease (using cryptocurrency) VPS instances in a neutral, privacy-respecting country and self-host a web-mail stack oneself. There isn't really a practical way around this because powerful nation states are able to demand access to customer data from almost every cloud/VPS provider in their jurisdiction.

0. https://proton.me/legal/transparency

Nearly all email is encrypted in transit. All major MTA systems send encrypted and accept encrypted as the default.

This article is about encrypting the body of the email which is easy* but no widely implemented standard exists.

* Stupid easy for two nerds to email securely.

* Stupid hard to work with multiple people and non-nerds.

Unfortunately, those are 2 different problems. It’s easy to have servers store encryption keys to make https work. You only need to encrypt trafic between you and a server for 5 seconds at a time.

It’s hard for personal communications. The server shouldn’t know the keys, and they need to survive for decades.

HTTPS is pervasive because Google encouraged it. Gmail could force S/MIME but they don't care.

Issue 3.. most/many governments are taking active steps to discourage this practice or better still (for them), stamp it out completely.

Nobody expects privacy when they send a postcard.

Most people keep their emails behind a password for a reason...