I think we can safely assume that a device that does that for entire offices at once is in the NSA's current ANT catalog. And other state actors are probably not far behind

The only thing making these kinds of attacks unattractive is that most companies are too stingy to buy anything better than a cheap wired Logitech keyboard

Isn't this kind of thing a trinket at Defcon these days like the pineapple thing, or even a Flipper plugin? Ie not super hard to get and not so much mustache.

moustache-twirly implying highly improbable?

More likely 8.333% I would think (1/12). The same probability of a broken clock yielding the correct hour.

I never knew about the 50Mbaud figure, is anything above 10M even achievable in a real world scenario?

It does solve this by having a different topology. It supports a configurable number of streams in each direction, so at least in theory 5.2 surround with a stereo microphone should be possible, we'll see if it's usable

It also supports what is often called 'true wireless' earbuds by default, as each audio sink can stream only the channel it's interested in.

Finally there's all that broadcasting stuff, which works fine in our tests most of the time but also with a myriad of issues, some of them in the spec, others in the Android implementation, which is currently the de facto target to support

> How many embedded devices transmit sensitive information?

Every Zigbee device uses AES keys to secure the network, although the security of the protocol is pretty weak in most deployments, especially when new devices join the network. Leaking the network key would provide access to the entire network. The ARM Cortex-M4 is often used, which the side-channel attack in the article is about.

For one key, assuming it does not change within that time.

There's a lot of signal left between you and the noise floor!

Everything has data exhaust.... the exhaust type just differs.