MCP-Scanner – Scan MCP Servers for vulnerabilities

76 pointsposted 5 hours ago
by hsanthan

19 Comments

rdegges

an hour ago

At Snyk, we've been working on this for a while. Here's our flagship open source project consolidating a lot of the MCP risk factors we've discovered over the last year or so into actionable info: https://github.com/invariantlabs-ai/mcp-scan

tsouth

38 minutes ago

I have seen a bunch of demos of this, often building on top of open standards like the SAFE-MCP MITRE ATT&CK analysis https://github.com/SAFE-MCP/safe-mcp

In general, the only way to make sure MCPs are safe is to limit which connections are made in an enterprise setting

cyberax

4 hours ago

The MCP landscape is a huge frothing septic tank. Go on, try to create a simple MCP server that is protected by a password and connect it to ChatGPT or Claude. Or even the one that uses your local SSO system for authentication.

I tried and failed after about 3 days of dealing with AI-slop-generated nonsense that has _never_ been worked. The MCP spec was created probably by brainless AI agents, so it defines two authentication methods: no authentication whatsoever, and OAuth that requires bleeding-edge features (dynamic client registration) not implemented by Google or Microsoft.

The easiest way for that right now is to ask users to download a random NodeJS package that runs locally on their machines with minimal confinement.

jngiam1

11 minutes ago

It's really messy now. ChatGPT in particular makes it really hard; it turns out that Custom GPTs with actions can do pretty well, if you bridge MCP tools into actions; but setting any of these up is a pita.

The LLMs are also really bad at generating correct code for OAuth logic - there are too many conditions there, and the DCR dance is fairly complicated to get right.

Shameless plug: we're building a MCP gateway that takes in any MCP server and we do the heavy lifting to make it compatible with any client on the other end (Claude, ChatGPT - even with custom actions); as a nice bonus it gives you SSO/logs as well. https://mintmcp.com if you're interested.

tsouth

40 minutes ago

The MCP & DCR OAuth ecosystem was immature at the start, but has really evolved and become robust. E.g., WorkOS has some really robust OAuth that can act as a standalone proxy for MCP connecting to any existing auth infrastructure.

Metadata and resource indicators are solving the rest of the problems that came with the change to OAuth spec.

fasbiner

3 hours ago

Had an almost identical experience. Even if you don’t need anything with auth, no one has yet made an mcp that wasn’t ultimately worse or the same as a cli but with a lot more song and dance. Security is also a bit of a joke when half the time it’s installing docker and phoning home. I wanted to like mcp and vend out remote mcp but this spec is not ready.

morkalork

2 hours ago

I'm still confused as to how mcp is better that say a Fastapi endpoint and it's generated swagger docs?

mbreese

2 hours ago

In the cases I’ve tried building/integrating they are the same thing…

I think the only difference is the statefulness of the request. HTTP is stateless, but MCP has state? Is this right?

I haven’t seen many use cases for how to use the state effectively, but I thought that was the main difference over a plain REST API.

eric-burel

2 hours ago

My understanding is that it can upgrade to an SSE connection so a persistent stream. Also for interprocess communication you usually prefer a persistent connection. All that to reduce communication overheads. The rationale also is that an AI agent may trigger more fine-grained calls than a normal program or a UI, as it needs to collect information to observe the situation and decide next move (lot more get requests than usual for instance).

fasbiner

an hour ago

Using SSE was far too inconvenient in theory despite that being how nearly all of the MCP that gained traction was working, so instead the spec was switched to being better in theory but very inconvenient in practice:

https://blog.fka.dev/blog/2025-06-06-why-mcp-deprecated-sse-...

There are a million "why don't you _just_ X?" hypothetical responses to all the real issues people have with streamable http as implemented in the spec, but you can't argue your way into a level of ecosystem support that doesn't exist. The exact same screwup with oAuth too, so we can see who is running the show and how they think.

It's hard to tell if there is some material business plan Anthropic has with these changes or if the people in charge of defining the spec are just kind of out of touch, have non-technical bosses, and have managed to politically disincentivize other engineers from pointing out basic realities.

bootsmann

3 hours ago

“Ok, how do we do customer auth” has become my go-to question to kill MCP projects. There is no working solution which makes any kind of enterprise exploration into the space pointless.

maxwellg

an hour ago

The initial remote MCP specification was pretty painful, but the June spec and the upcoming November spec are much more workable - MCP auth is (mostly) just OAuth now. MCP Clients are OAuth clients and can be granted access tokens and managed just like any other 3rd party app integration.

I'd love to hear more about the specific issues you're running into with the new version of the spec. (disclaimer - I work at an auth company! email in bio if you wanna chat)

mbreese

2 hours ago

Serious question, as I’m starting to go through this process myself -

Is it possible for the customer to provide their own bearer tokens (generated however) that the LLM can pass along to the MCP server? This was the closest to a workable security I’ve looked at. I don’t know if that is all that well supported by Chat GUI/web clients (user supplied tokens), but should be possible when calling an LLM through an API style call, right (if you add additional pass thru headers)?

eric-burel

2 hours ago

The LLM doesn't intervene much actually, it just tells what tool to call. It's your MCP implementation that does the heavy lifting. So yeah you can always shove a key somewhere in your app context and pass it to the tool call. But I think the point of other comments is that the MCP protocol is kinda clueless about how to standardize that within the protocol itself.

arscan

an hour ago

I think an important thing to note is the MCP client is a distinct thing from the ‘LLM’ architecturally, though many LLM providers also have MCP client implementations (via their chat ui or desktop / cli implementations).

In general, I’d say it’s not a good idea to pass bearer tokens to the LLM provider and keep that to the MCP client. But your client has to be interoperable with the MCP server at the auth level, which is flakey at the moment across the ecosystem of generic MCP clients and servers as noted.

zingababba

3 hours ago

throwaway314155

3 hours ago

MCP works best for tool calling that doesn't require auth (so tools that are trusted on your own machine). The whole pitch that you should be using it for business facing tools and things that require auth is a terrible idea.

Even if you're doing local only - MCP tools can mostly be covered by simply asking Claude Code (or whatever) to use the bash equivalent.

cyberax

2 hours ago

> MCP works best for tool calling that doesn't require auth (so tools that are trusted on your own machine).

In other words, downloading random crap that runs unconfined and requires a shitty app like Claude Desktop.

BTW, Claude Desktop is ALSO an example of AI slop. It barely works, constantly just closing chats, taking 10 seconds to switch between conversations, etc.

In my case, I wanted to connect our CRM with ChatGPT and ask it to organize our customer notes. And also make this available as a service to users, so they won't have to be AI experts with subscriptions to Claude.