repiret
3 hours ago
I agree with all of the articles points except for the first one: TPM and Secure Boot do not reduce user choice or promote state or corporate surveillance. If you want to be able to prevent root kits you need secure boot, and if you want to store secrets that don't need a user password to unlock and can't be stolen by taking apart the computer, you need a TPM; or you need substantially similar alternatives.
I would say that specifically with Secure Boot, Microsoft actually promoted user choice: A Windows Logo compliant PC needs to have Microsoft's root of trust installed by default. Microsoft could have stopped there, but they didn't. A Windows Logo compliant PC _also_ needs a way for users to install their own root of trust. Microsoft didn't need to add that requirement. Sure, there are large corporate and government buyers that would insist on that, but they could convince (without loss of generality) Dell to offer it to them. Instead, Microsoft said all PCs need it, and as a result, anybody who wants to take advantage of secure boot can do so if they go through the bother of installing their own root of trust and signing their boot image.
heavyset_go
2 hours ago
> I would say that specifically with Secure Boot, Microsoft actually promoted user choice: A Windows Logo compliant PC needs to have Microsoft's root of trust installed by default. Microsoft could have stopped there, but they didn't.
This was not the case with the initial rollout of Secure Boot, it was combined with locked BIOS to lock PCs so that they could only boot Windows 8 on some devices. This was the case on Windows RT ARM machines from that era.
All that has to be done today for machines to be locked down again is to flip a bit or blow an e-fuse. It's already the case on phones and tablets.
There is also a real potential for abusing TPMs or cryptographic co-processors to enforce remote attestation.
I say this as someone who agrees with your first paragraph and uses Secure Boot + TPMs on all of my machines.
IlikeKitties
2 hours ago
> There is also a real potential for abusing TPMs or cryptographic co-processors to enforce remote attestation.
People here REALLY need to start understanding this issue. Remote Attestation is the kind of tech that if abused will end free computing over night.
heavyset_go
an hour ago
Remote attestation is already here with Play Protect/Integrity on Android, and Microsoft's Pluton co-processor enables the same thing
nerdsniper
17 minutes ago
See also:
- Private Access Token [0]
- Web Environment Integrity [1]
among other proposals.
weikju
2 hours ago
s/if/when/
edg5000
5 minutes ago
> if you want to store secrets that don't need a user password to unlock and can't be stolen by taking apart the computer, you need a TPM
I had a Win 7 system and just entered a password on boot, this decrypted the disk. It was supported without mods or TPM (maybe some registry tweaks though). On Ubuntu I do the same, no need for TPM. Am I missing something? My disk is encrypted. If they take it apart, they need my password to crack the encryption.
josephcsible
2 hours ago
TPM and Secure Boot would be good things if there were no way to prove to third parties that you're using them, or have them configured a certain way (i.e., remote attestation). It's the fact that that is possible that makes them reduce user choice and promote state and corporate surveillance.
scheeseman486
2 hours ago
On the face of it they're just security features, and I don't deny they are, but the industry as a whole are using those features to implement device verification systems that are being used to lock down their platforms and centralize control over their software ecosystems.
Being able to install another OS isn't much good if critical applications and websites refuse to run on it.
gruez
2 hours ago
>Being able to install another OS isn't much good if critical applications and websites refuse to run on it.
The battle has already been lost on this. Just look at all the companies that are app-only and don't offer a web version.
scheeseman486
an hour ago
I wouldn't say it's lost, but the trendlines aren't good.
cam_l
2 hours ago
I honestly have only come across one company that is app only. That was because I was with them when they changed over, otherwise I would never have signed up.
This was my local gym which sacked their front desk staff and moved to app access only, and with an app infested with trackers at that. Needless to say I don't go to that gym anymore.
gruez
2 hours ago
It's popular with fintechs, especially new ones. Robinhood for instance was app-only for a few years before they got their web version. Revolut theoretically has a web version but it has far less features than the mobile app. Restaurant "apps" (for ordering and offers) are often app-only as well.
AstralStorm
2 hours ago
Thing is, because the whole design is closed as well as firmware, the security of it is near zero, even for sealing firmware device images (e.g. option ROM), much less bootloaders. Multiple security holes have been found.
There's no issue booting a boot rootkit with the standard Windows bootloader unless you manually seal the image with command line or group policy, and even then it's possible to bypass by installing a fresh bootloader because the images are identical and will boot after a wipe.
isodev
5 minutes ago
> Microsoft actually promoted user choice
Let’s not give Microsoft too much credit here…
Between 2011 and 2013, multiple Linux / free software organisations raised the issue with the EC. There was an actual antitrust investigation which at the time was seen as what motivated Microsoft to open the solution to third parties by 2013.
So in a way, thank you EU for making it so we have choices at all.
With that said, I think the technology still does more to promote vendor lock-in and as other said, it’s one windows update away from a dystopian hellscape where all your bits have been pre-approved by someone else.
trinsic2
2 hours ago
I think it has the potential to create that situation if those features ever change. I should probably update that language, but I still feel from a consumer choice perspective, those solutions seem vendor specific and not governed by an open organization.
ivolimmen
an hour ago
matheusmoreira
8 minutes ago
> TPM and Secure Boot do not reduce user choice or promote state or corporate surveillance
Now with remote attestation they do.
> installing their own root of trust and signing their boot image
Won't matter. They can tell we did this. They won't trust our keys. Only their own.
IlikeKitties
3 hours ago
You are 100% correct and we can see the situation on phones where you can't boot anything not approved by the vendor.
juped
2 hours ago
These are old counterproductive FSF memes that should be retired, but stick around anyway.