Yeah, there was a recording published quite soon after the incident, of the conversation between the seemingly older and experienced tanker captain (speaking in a typical western coastal dialect as if he was born on a boat), and the seemingly quite young naval officer (who sounds like he's from the middle of Oslo), which I'm sure shaped opinion quite strongly:

https://youtu.be/NYqGxbKF0AI?feature=shared&t=110

Well, the navy has been trying to make Navantia take the blame for quite a while.

The report link in TFA isn't working, I think this is the relevant report but it does not actually contain that sentence.

https://msiu.gov.mt/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/PDF-Safety_In...

https://msiu.gov.mt/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/PDF-Safety_In...

So I wonder what the source for that line is.

Think it a silly gramatical error and should read:

> confusion and internal communication problems limited the damage control effort

> Lessons

> It would be wrong to entirely blame the inexperienced OOW and poor performance of the bridge team for the incident, the investigation showed there were management failures that extended to the highest levels of the Navy. The pressure caused by the operational tempo, something the RN and USN would recognise, resulted in inadequate training time and personnel lacking sufficient experience in relation to their responsibilities.

Sounds like other people have asked. And the lack of time for sleep is only one aspect of the answer.

Most likely answer, based on [1] is that this was investigated and not a contributing factor. I infer this from thinking that investigators know for sure that the operational awareness of the watch can be impacted by watch schedules.

Training for the test versus training for operational deployment.

[1] Safety Investigations by Other Countries - https://msiu.gov.mt/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/PDF-Safety_In...

This is Norway. Nobody is forced to work to the point of sleep deprivation, doubly so in the public sector.

Look at the damage that the tanker did in terms of hole size and compartments breaches. It's on the order of a hit from an anti-ship missile.

The frigate was in a peacetime "basically in my home harbor" configuration so it's not like the ship was all buttoned up in preparation to take battle damage nor was the crew on any sort of alert.

Had they been in a more "normal for situations where you might get shot at" state of alertness they wouldn't have blundered into hitting a tanker and if they did it wouldn't have sunk them.

There's a reason these accidents happen in friendly waters and not the area of the world where you have both oil tankers and unfriendly forces.

Compare and contrast to the recent collision of Chinese combat ships around the Philippines - much more severe damage, much less severe outcome.

Someone needs to take a very hard look at this.

Yes, and blue water navy advocates have been wilfully ignorant to this for at least a decade now.

In this instance, the excuses given are always:

* the small number on watch did not provide enough people to effectively commence damage control,

* the poorly trained crew did not close bulkheads as they evacuated from berths,

* the design did not have sufficient redundancy.

This ignores that all navies now:

* run lean crews and ultra-lean watches, relying on automation,

* training standards are dropping everywhere due to cost, and far fewer seafarers enter naval service with prior experience,

* ships are becoming more automated and cost-sensitive, so new frigates like the Type 26 (that will replace the Fridtjof Nansen-class frigates) or the upcoming US DDG(X)-class are likely to have significantly reduced redundancies and damage-control capacity, given tonnage is increasing by 40+% but crews are shrinking.

> ... already inadequate bilge pump system which failed to remove any water from the ship. Many hatches and doors that would maintain watertight integrity were left open, essentially to facilitate movement of personnel and portable pumps which proved ineffective.

And the article goes on to say that the ship's watertight doors and hatches would have save her from sinking, if the crew had bothered to close those on their way out.

If you are miserably incompetent at the very basics of both design and operation, then "investing" in more advanced stuff is just a cool-sounding waste of money.

Makes one thing just how effective simple ramming could be. Not to even talk about explosives... Take a basic steel boat. Fill with say styrox, mount large engines and remote controls. Just drive it at full speed to warship.

You could mass produce something like that for less than 100k from stock standard parts.

I'm by no means a military expert, but with modern missiles is it really reasonable to take a hit and continue operation? It's a valid strategy to invest in defenses to prevent a hit from landing rather than survivability if one does.

The ships captain / commanding officer was kicked up in the system.

The officer of the watch, as is military tradition, received all the blame. But it should be said that the commanding officer was ready to take all the blame...but the court eventually found the officer of the watch to be responsible. And that is correct. When you work/serve in the military, at least in Norway, the hierarchy of responsibility is very strict. Even the lowest ranking officer can end up being responsible for a billion dollar vessel / station / etc.

The names of these people are not made public, and it is fairly simple to write your resume in such a way that it will obfuscate your role. The only people that know, are those intimately familiar with the case (from the inside), or know someone that does.

When I worked in the military, albeit in a civilian role, one of my co-workers had been a sailor on this ship around the time this happened.

Generally it would be career-ending for a naval officer (both OOW and captain), but it really is a systemic problem present in a lot of other navies. Seamanship is simply neglected because of the cost (both in time and money) of proper training.

The article mentions the collision would likely have never happened in poor visibility, because the OOW would have kept watch on radar (which they should be doing in all weather conditions, anyway) and would have been a lot slower over ground.

That's because a lot of young (post-PC/smartphone era) sailors hold much more confidence in electronic nav tools than their own abilities. The OOW was most likely accustomed to relying on AIS (which they had turned off for tactical reasons).

> The OOW and trainee officer discussed the floodlights but believed they were ashore and stationary. Confirmation bias and lack of experience led the OOW to keep thinking this was the case until too late. Inexplicably there was only brief use of navigational radar and AIS to check the situation and they interpreted the tanker as a stationary object alongside at the terminal.

The simplest check could have resolved this. If the lights maintained a constant bearing as the warship made way, it would have been obvious (unless heading straight for or away) that it was another vessel. Watchkeeping 101.

It's an issue we see again and again at sea. Militaries and corporates alike aren't willing to put in the time to make seafarers (which takes years) and relies instead on electronic aides, which are excellent and work 90+, 95+ percent of the time. When they don't, though....

Mostly they put full blame on the trainee they put on overtime guard duty and called it a day. https://www.nrk.no/vestland/vaktsjefen-pa-_helge-ingstad_-do...

> However, quick ask of an AI says that the anecdote ending is probably a urban myth told to demonstrate a management principle, so we don't know what happened to the employee nor how they feel.

Mine says there are two Rs in strawberry, but who knows your oracle of truth might be right

Can’t speak for the Norwegians but that is not how at-sea watchstanding works in, e.g., the US Navy. The OOD is the captain’s delegate in operating the ship. In peacetime steaming, there may not be another khaki (officer or chief petty officer) on watch who is qualified to stand OOD - the JOOD/JOOW is typically a trainee, and the CIC watch officer is often a non-OOD-qualified junior officer or chief petty officer. They can and should all provide support to the OOD but usually nobody is available to babysit or step in. All of the babysitting should have happened before the OOD ever got their OOD qual.

Which btw tells you what has gone wrong in many of these situations: the OOD was given a qualification they were not ready for, because not having enough OODs means the actually-qualified OODs will be standing port/starboard watch and be exhausted all the time. COs and XOs give the weak OODs quiet steaming watches they think will be easy, but a shipping channel can get busy earlier than expected and everything can go to shit really quickly.

Naval vessels carries spare hardware for all that sort of stuff and "we've taken a hit in the <pick some compartments> the comms/power/water/steam/hydraulic line is severed, run the spares, fight the fires" is a fairly standard drill.

The Integrated Platform Management System (IPMS) on HING was state-of-the-art at the time, having been upgraded prior to the collision. The report found that the system operated as expected, but that the OOW had not been trained on its proper use and was not able to recognise the alarms.

Just like USS John S. McCain and USS Fitzgerald, until fully autonomous, the ships are only as good as their command and crews.