simonvc
3 days ago
Was drinking in a bar in Espoo in 2012 or 2013 and heard this from someone at rovio. At the time they used Riak db and basho were onsite and we asked why they didn't enable inter server encryption. "Because nsa pay us 10m not to". Guess nsa pulled the Riak cluster protocol off the aws fibre.
adeon
3 days ago
Is there any reliable source for NSA paying Rovio other than this random bar discussion? Not that I don't believe you or that I'm naive about NSA and the power of money, but I looked around news in 2014 and the accusations against Rovio specifically are a bit different flavor. It seems that Rovio was oversharing data to ad networks (Millennial Media comes up a lot), and NSA likely slurped data from the advertising companies. This bar banter is suggesting that NSA had some kind of arrangement with Rovio directly instead, and Rovio willingly went along.
Or alternatively, do you feel the Rovio employee's blabbering was talking about an actual, real NSA deal with Rovio, or was it more like a bar joke and direct NSA co-operation was not really implied? (e.g. "we know our security is bad, but these ad companies pay us $XX million to not use encryption so it's sorta like NSA pays us to keep it that way sips beer").
I'm interested, because if that is an actual thing that happened, then that's an example of NSA paying a Finnish company $$$ to weaken their security, and the Finnish company willingly agreeing to that. Is it in NSA's Modus Operandi to approach and then pay foreign companies to do this sort of thing?
Your comment is describing it in few words, but to me it sounds like it maybe wasn't implying an actual NSA direct co-operation, more like someone doing bar banter and being entirely serious. But that's just me trying to guess tone.
(I'm Finnish. I want to know if Rovio has skeletons in their closet. So I can roast them.)
leftcenterright
3 days ago
from an intelligence perspective, this is business as usual.
- Rovio sold data to ad companies (ad companies primarily based in the US)
- They used AWS (to which of course NSA has legal access)
- Data is not end to end encrypted, all metadata sits on servers in plain text and within AWS even moves from server to server in plain text
How much insight metadata can grant to someone like NSA is still wildly underrated.
- https://www.propublica.org/article/spy-agencies-probe-angry-...
adeon
3 days ago
Ah yeah, I saw the propublica as well, it was one of the first articles I found when looking on the topic. I don't doubt at all that Angry Birds data was used by NSA, doesn't seem controversial.
The specific question I am interested in is: Did Rovio knowingly and willingly accept $$$ from NSA (directly or indirectly) to weaken their security? I.e. were they acting as a willing accomplice.
Because that part would be unusual for Finland (well, at least as far as I know). For US companies I wouldn't bat an eye at news like this.
leftcenterright
3 days ago
Here is a nice talk by Byron Tau who has also written a book titled "Means of Control" detailing some of these flows covering ad tech companies, data brokers and how government contractors use them and serve as a key player to provide services to intelligence agencies.
- https://www.interface-eu.org/events/background-talk-with-byr...
leftcenterright
3 days ago
I think they definitely knew that they are embedding code from US based ad agencies who might either be selling it to the NSA or just doing it in an insecure manner (plaintext protocols).
Mostly in such cases, direct involvement and paying dollars is a clear no-go for the intelligence agencies. They could instead be paying the ad agencies.
Also note that we are talking pre-Let's encrypt and TLS everywhere world, a lot of this traffic was also just plain text making it much easier to harvest.
Some interesting insights from this piece: https://web.archive.org/web/20180719081149/https://theinterc...
adeon
2 days ago
Thanks for the resources. Got back to procrastinate on HN and checked the resources (briefly looked at transcript on the video, but found this article more interesting).
I've always assumed that some amount of unencrypted HTTP traffic is going to be slurped into archives, but I've been too lazy to really check an example and how does that look like in the real world. That BADASS system is an example, focusing on phones. I've also run mitmproxy in my home to learn and then I've wondered if the big agencies have something like that but much more scaled and sophisticated.
I've recently got into studying security, deobfuscated code, or decompiling, tried to find vulnerabilities or bad security, in websites and programs. I've found some, although not anything worth writing home about. I found a replay attack in one VSCode extension that implemented its own encrypted protocol, but it is difficult to use it to do real damage. Found a bad integrity check library (hopelessly naive against canonicalization attack) used by another VSCode extension. I've found something weird in Anthropic's Claude website after you log in, but because their "responsible security policy" is so draconian, I don't want to bother trying to poke it to research it further in case I earn their wrath.
Biggest bummer I found that a video game (Don't Starve Together) I had played for a long time with friends does not have any encryption whatsoever for chat messages to this day. (People gonna say private things in video game chats). The other video game I play in multiplayer a lot, Minecraft, has encryption (a bit unusual encryption but it is encryption).
That article gave me a bit of validation that I'm not a nut for giving shits about encryption and security, and being annoyed at ungodly amount of analytics I see in mitmproxy my laptop is blabbering about.
belter
3 days ago
Misheard and it was RSA instead of Rovio? The numbers match... :-)
https://www.reuters.com/article/world/exclusive-secret-contr...
financetechbro
3 days ago
Perhaps $10M is the standard rate for this type of service?
adeon
3 days ago
Lol, yeah, I also learned yesterday that there is apparently, NSA, National Security Authority. No, not the NSA this article is talking about and everyone knows about.
I mean: National Security Authority, "Kansallinen turvallisuusviranomainen", which appears to be some office/people under Finnish foreign affairs: https://um.fi/national-security-authority-nsa-contact-inform...
I will say I got confused a moment yesterday when googling on the topic here because when you put NSA and Finland in the same search, it would get topics about this other NSA that just happens to exist which I had never heard of before, and just happens to be Finland-associated.
fiatpandas
3 days ago
I’m actually comforted by the fact that NSA needed encryption turned off to spy.
starspangled
3 days ago
On the other hand it would be a very cheap counter espionage measure if a small stream of such payments was enough to convince China et al that the NSA had not broken encryption.
danielheath
3 days ago
Or it was simply cheaper than cracking it.
hx8
3 days ago
I was comforted by the idea that it is more expensive than $10m to crack encryption, but this was in 2013.
greenavocado
3 days ago
Earth's oceans contain approximately 1.35 billion cubic kilometers of water. To raise this entire volume from an average temperature of 3.5C to boiling (100 C), we'd need roughly: 1.35 x 10^21 kg x 4,184 J/(kg C) x 96.5C is approximately 5.45 x 10^25 joules That's 545 million exajoules or about 10,000 times humanity's annual energy consumption.
If you tried to brute-force AES-256 with conventional computers, you'd need to check 2^256 possible keys. Even with a billion billion (10^18) attempts per second: 2^256 operations / 10^18 operations/second is approximately 10^59 seconds. You'd need about 2.7 x 10^41 universe lifetimes to crack AES-256
At about 10 watts per computer, this would require approximately 10^60 joules, or roughly 2 x 10^34 times the energy needed to boil the oceans. You could boil the oceans, refill them, and repeat this process 200 trillion trillion trillion times.
For RSA-2048, the best classical algorithms would need about 2^112 operations. This would still require around 10^27 joules, or about 20 times what's needed to boil the oceans.
ECC with a 256-bit key would need roughly 2^128 operations to crack, requiring approximately 10^31 joules It's enough to boil the oceans about 2,000 times over.
Quantum computers could theoretically use Shor's algorithm to break RSA and ECC much faster. But to break RSA-2048, we'd need a fault-tolerant quantum computer with millions of qubits. Current quantum computers have fewer than 1,000 stable qubits. Even with quantum computing, the energy requirements would still be astronomical. Perhaps enough to boil all the oceans once or twice, rather than thousands of times.
0xbadcafebee
3 days ago
That's assuming there's no attacks found in a given algorithm. If there is a feasible attack found, the math changes, sometimes dramatically. And we'll never know it because they sure as hell aren't gonna announce it.
Anyway, I'm not worried because governments don't need to crack encryption to do dastardly shit. They have far easier methods to get what they want.
cenamus
3 days ago
Also just picking constants for encryption algorithms that are supposed to be "nothing up my sleeve" numbers, like the n first digits of pi.
DJB had a good talk about how many degrees of freedom you can still get picking such numbers and how much you can weaken crypto algorithms (even though not outright breaking them), but I can't find it at the moment
rightbyte
3 days ago
You need to account for the heat of vaporization if you plan on boil away and refilling the oceans for your brute force scheme, so you overestimate how many times you will boil away the oceans by a factor of 6 or something.
chokma
3 days ago
For more calculations about the use of (computational) brute force: https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/09/the_doghouse_...
"... brute-force attacks against 256-bit keys will be infeasible until computers are built from something other than matter and occupy something other than space.
swyx
3 days ago
is there a hall of fame for HN comments somewhere because i nominate this one
danieldk
3 days ago
This is a pretty old pattern (meme?). E.g. also used way back (2004) to what it would take to fill a ZFS storage pool at its maximum size:
https://web.archive.org/web/20170802160910/https://blogs.ora...
kragen
3 days ago
Calculating how much work a brute-force attack on a cryptosystem would take goes back to the 01970s if not before.
r721
3 days ago
Maybe this:
>highlights Particularly good comments from over the years
j_bum
3 days ago
I want to steal this as a copypasta
buran77
3 days ago
The "boiling the ocean" argument comes up every once in a while for some time now, just a lot more structured and number packed in the age of LLMs. There are even funny "security" levels based on this [0] like "lake security".
The picture they paint is very useful to help people grasp the scale of "worst case" brute forcing while being completely misleading on the effort needed to break encryption "somehow". Cracking the encryption isn't usually about brute forcing every possible combination, it's all about finding or building a flaw in the algorithm.
Bike thieves don't go through the 10000 combinations on your lock, scammers don't try every possible email password, etc.
Brute forcing a key finds you one answer at a time, hacking the algorithm finds you all answers at once. Without boiling the ocean.
[0] https://asecuritysite.com/blog/2018-08-05_Boiling-Every-Ocea...
greenavocado
3 days ago
An adversary with full Intel Management Engine (IME) access could intercept AES-NI instruction calls before execution, replacing them with compromised implementations that maintain superficial compliance with expected behaviors. The encryption would still function much like a funeral home makeup artist ensures the deceased appears lifelike. These direct instruction interceptions occur at a level below the operating system and hypervisor, making them essentially invisible to security monitoring.
The IME's DMA capabilities enable memory inspection without host awareness. Cryptographic keys residing in RAM become visible to this subsystem, essentially placing the combination to the digital vault in plain view of an entity designed never to be seen. One might say the keys to the kingdom are being displayed on a billboard visible only to those standing in another dimension. This extraction could happen before legitimate AES-NI operations even process the key material.
Random number generation becomes particularly vulnerable. By introducing subtle biases to hardware entropy sources like CPU thermal or timing sensors, an adversary could ensure generated keys fall within a predictable pattern while presenting all appearances of randomness.
Statistical tests would show nothing amiss, like a perfectly balanced coin that somehow lands heads 51% of the time over millions of flips, a mathematical miracle that passes unnoticed until the casino's bankruptcy. These manipulations would bias the PRNG to produce predictable entropy patterns that drastically reduce effective key space.
Microcode updates deployed through IME channels could modify AES-NI instruction behavior at its core, ensuring the cryptographic equivalent of building a vault door with steel exterior panels but papier-mache hinges. Everything looks secure until someone approaches from the correct angle. These updates could specifically target the AES-NI implementation to use reduced key space or introduce mathematical weaknesses into the diffusion properties of the algorithm.
Side-channel attack facilitation presents another avenue for compromise. The IME could enable precise timing measurements of AES operations, deliberately increase susceptibility to cache-timing attacks, and manipulate power states to enhance the effectiveness of power analysis techniques while appearing to function normally.
The most effective entropy reduction strategy would likely combine several approaches: replacing the AES-NI implementation with one that only explores a fraction of the key space, creating deterministic but seemingly random patterns for key generation, leaking key material via covert channels to the IME's persistent storage, and maintaining the outward appearance of full entropy while drastically reducing actual security margins.
Detection of such tampering remains virtually impossible given the IME's isolated execution environment.
Security researchers can only examine the results of cryptographic operations, unable to observe the process directly similar to trying to determine if someone has tampered with your food while blindfolded. The mathematics of AES remain sound, of course. But mathematics requires faithful execution to maintain security guarantees, and therein lies the fundamental issue.
kragen
3 days ago
AES-NI itself doesn't provide an avenue for key entropy reduction, since it doesn't generate keys itself, or for exfiltration of stolen keys through the encrypted output, or for introducing mathematical weaknesses into the diffusion properties of the algorithm. If an AES implementation produces output that differs by even one bit from a correct AES implementation, then decryption will fail.
Non-constant timing would also be detectable, though as you say cache side channels are feasible. Power-side-channel key exfiltration is certainly feasible if the attacker can measure power consumption, but AES-NI isn't relevant to many threat models that permit power side channels; amd64 CPUs aren't used in smartcards.
But certainly the IME could steal AES or other cryptographic keys from memory, store them in its own storage, and leak them through some other channel.
buran77
3 days ago
Thanks LLM...
kbelder
3 days ago
I don't think you'd be the first.
kragen
3 days ago
This is an excellent comment, but I think it's worth pointing out some lacunae.
The most important one is that we're assuming that nobody finds a weakness in AES-256, so we have to brute-force it instead of taking some kind of shortcut. Historically speaking, that doesn't seem like a sure bet. (Some slight progress has been made on AES, but nothing practically useful yet: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard#K...) Similar comments apply to factoring large semiprimes and ECDLP; algorithmic improvements could remove many orders of magnitude from these estimates.
Sometimes, even when weaknesses aren't known in the algorithms themselves, there are weaknesses in how they are applied. The Debian OpenSSL fiasco, which seems to have been accidental, may be the best-known example: all secret keys were generated with only 16 bits of entropy. Reusing IVs for OFB or CTR mode is also catastrophic.
A somewhat pedantic note is that you seem to be using two conflicting definitions of "boil the oceans" in different parts of your comment: to raise them to the boiling temperature while leaving them liquid, at first, and to convert them to vapor, later, since you talk about "refilling them". Converting them to vapor requires several times more energy than that. Also, you dropped an order of magnitude somewhere; raising the oceans to boiling requires 5.46 × 10²⁶ J, not 5... × 10²⁵ as you say. ("545 million exajoules" is correct.)
I used `cal_mean` from units(1) to do the calculation, which is based on the mean specific heat of water from 1° to 100°. I'm not sure that's correct for salt water, though, and in any case that's a minor error.
"about 10,000 times humanity's annual energy consumption" is wrong. 545 million exajoules is about a million years of humanity's energy consumption, which is only about 18 terawatts, excluding agriculture.
As gosub100 pointed out, on average you only have to try 2²⁵⁵ possible keys before finding the right one, not all 2²⁵⁶, but that's only a factor of 2.
10¹⁸ AES attempts per second does seem like a reasonable upper bound, but it's much faster than currently existing encryption hardware. 10¹⁸ Hz is the frequency of 0.3-nanometer X-rays with an energy of about 4000 electron volts. I feel like any computer hardware that is performing operations that fast probably cannot be made out of molecules or atoms. You might be able to build it on the surface of a neutron star or a black hole. Seth Lloyd's Nature paper from 02000 on the "ultimate laptop", "Ultimate physical limits to computation", explores some of the physical phenomena involved, and how fast they could possibly compute: https://faculty.pku.edu.cn/_resources/group1/M00/00/0D/cxv0B...
If we take 10¹⁸ Hz and 2²⁵⁶ cycles as given, it is true that one computer would need 10⁵⁹ seconds to finish the job (4×10⁵¹ years), which is indeed about 2.7 × 10⁴¹ times longer than the universe has existed so far (13.79 billion years). But it's worth pointing out that the universe's lifetime is not yet over; it is expected to continue existing much longer than that: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_far_future lists various stages of its future evolution, including the end of star formation in 10¹²–10¹⁴ years, the last star burning out in 1.2 × 10¹⁴ years, 10³⁰ years until all the galaxies fall apart, 2×10³⁶–3×10⁴³ years until all protons and neutrons are gone (if protons decay), 10⁹¹ years until the Milky Way's black hole evaporates, and 10¹⁰⁶–2.1×10¹⁰⁹ years until the last black holes evaporate. If protons are stable, you could definitely build a computer that kept computing for the necessary 10⁵² years.
And (as you point out next!) you could use more than one computer. If you could somehow use 10⁵⁹ computers, you could finish the job in a second, rather than in untold eons. It depends on how many computers you can get!
"10 watts" is a somewhat handwavy estimate. Most of the computers around me, in things like my multimeter and my MicroSD card, use a lot less power than that, often a few milliwatts. (The fact that the MicroSD card doesn't have a monitor and keyboard is irrelevant to using it for AES cracking.) I'm currently working on a project called the Zorzpad, to build a self-sufficient portable personal computing environment on under a milliwatt, something that has become possible recently due to advancements in subthreshold digital logic.
But even a milliwatt may be an overestimate for AES cracking on classical hardware, because reversible logic may be able to drop power consumption by one or more additional orders of magnitude, and as far as we know, there's no lower limit (not even the ones Lloyd's article talks about apply). AES cracking is especially suited for reversible computing, which is why I used it as an example in this comment a week ago: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43850835
It may be worth pointing out that 10⁶⁰ joules (which, despite the possible weaknesses above in its derivation, is certainly a plausible ballpark) is a large number not just measured against Earth, but measured against the Sun and indeed the energy output of the entire Milky Way galaxy.
It's even large compared to the available energy in the Milky Way. If you divide it by c² you get 1.2 × 10⁴³ kg. The Milky Way weighs 1.15 × 10¹² solar masses (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Milky_Way) which turns out to be 2.29 × 10⁴² kg, which is 2.06 × 10⁵⁹ J. So even if you converted the entire galaxy into energy to power your AES crackers, you wouldn't get 10⁶⁰ J.
It's probably worth including AES performance numbers on currently available hardware. You'll still get galactic numbers demonstrating that AES-256 is not currently brute-forceable.
greenavocado
3 days ago
Thank you for this correction and additional perspective.
The Debian vulnerability was particularly bad. An AES key with 16 bits of entropy can be broken with the energy used by a single LED for a fraction of a nanosecond.
Reducing entropy covertly is probably the sole purpose of the so-called Intel Management Engine
kragen
3 days ago
Happy to contribute!
I'm not sure the Debian vulnerability affected AES keys, but it definitely affected RSA keys.
A single LED is somewhere between 1 milliwatt and 1 watt, so in a tenth of a nanosecond it uses between 100 femtojoules and 100 picojoules. 2¹⁵ AES encryption operations currently require a lot more energy than that. I'm not sure how much, but it's a lot more.
How much does an AES encryption operation take? https://calomel.org/aesni_ssl_performance.html suggests AES-256-GCM runs at 2957 megabytes per second on each core of an "Intel Gold 5412U", which https://www.intel.la/content/www/xl/es/products/sku/232374/i... tells me is a 24-core CPU launched in Q1 of 02023 with a TDP of 185 watts. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard says the AES block size is 128 bits, so 2957MB/s is 185 million blocks per second per core. Dividing 185 watts by 24 cores of that gives 41.7 nanojoules per block. This is probably reasonably representative of energy requirements for current AES hardware implementations. It presumably doesn't include key setup time, and brute-force cracking will do more key setup than normal encryption, but it's probably in the ballpark, especially for dedicated chips ticking through closely related keys. In any case, key setup surely cannot take less than zero energy, so this represents a lower bound.
Running
openssl speed -elapsed -evp aes-256-gcm
on my own laptop (without -evp, I get "speed: Unknown algorithm aes-256-gcm"), I get 3900 megabytes per second for large block sizes, or 2300 megabytes per second running on battery power. The 'numbers' are in 1000s of bytes per second processed.
type 16 bytes 64 bytes 256 bytes 1024 bytes 8192 bytes 16384 bytes
AES-256-GCM 353329.81k 1012347.01k 2190564.18k 3178319.19k 3791358.63k 3676427.61k
According to cat /sys/class/power_supply/BAT0/power_now
I'm using about 12–16 million microwatts to do this, compared to about 6–8 watts when idle. So we can ballpark the AES energy consumption around 7 watts. Dividing that by 2300 megabytes per second, it comes out to about 49 nanojoules per block. This is reassuringly similar to the calomel numbers.The number for 16-byte blocks is much lower, like 240 megabytes per second on battery and 360 megabytes per second on AC power. This probably tells us key setup takes about an order of magnitude more energy than encrypting a block, but maybe that's just because AMD was optimizing encryption speed over key setup speed.
2¹⁵ times 40 nanojoules is 1.3 millijoules. This is between 13 million and 13 billion times more than the energy used by a single LED for a fraction of a nanosecond.
Also, 2²⁵⁵ times 40 nanojoules is 2.3 × 10⁶⁹ J, a couple billion times larger than your estimate upthread. It's pretty amazing than in 67 nanoseconds my CPU can encrypt something such that it would require, as far as we know, the resources of billions of galaxies to decrypt without knowing the key.
The IME is probably a backdoor, but I don't think we have enough information to say clearly what kind of backdoor.
gosub100
3 days ago
> you'd need to check 2^256 possible keys
it's very unlikely you'd have to check the entire keyspace before you found it. On average it would be about half.
MichaelDickens
3 days ago
That reduces the runtime from 2.7 x 10^41 universe lifetimes to 1.35 x 10^41. I'm still not worried.
OutOfHere
3 days ago
What if AES-128 is used? The expected keys to check then is just 2^64.
kragen
3 days ago
2¹²⁷ nanoseconds would be only 390 billion times longer than the universe has existed so far (13.79 billion years). If you wanted to crack AES-128 with brute force using one-billion-key-per-second cracking computers and could only wait a year, you would need 5.4 sextillion computers. If each of those computers weighed 100 milligrams, in the neighborhood of many current chips, their total mass would be 539 trillion tonnes (5.39 × 10¹⁸ kg, 539 exagrams).
That's only about a hundred thousandth of the mass of the Moon, and there are dozens of asteroids larger than this. Since it's clearly physically possible to disassemble an asteroid, or even the entire Moon, and build computers out of it, AES-128 should not be considered secure against currently known attacks. However, currently, it is not publicly known that the NSA has converted any asteroids into computers, and it seems unlikely to have happened secretly.
kuratkull
3 days ago
Example with smaller numbers:
2^10 / 2 = 512
512 is 2^9
So when dividing powers like this you decrement the exponent.
So no it's not 2^64 but more like 2^127
Dividing a loooong number with a small number has virtually no impact on the number.
OutOfHere
3 days ago
My apologies for my flagrant error. Thank you for the correction and clarity.
dankwizard
3 days ago
When the NSA invented AES-256 they have a code they can input to just bypass it.
bonzini
3 days ago
It's worth noting that when the NSA invented DES, they took a cipher from IBM and made it more resistant (to differential cryptanalysis, a technique that at the time wasn't known outside the NSA itself).
kragen
3 days ago
The NSA made it more resistant to differential cryptanalysis, but hundreds of times less resistant to brute-force attack; see http://cr.yp.to/talks/2022.11.10/slides-djb-20221110-nsa-4x3...
> NSA gave Tuchman a clearance and brought him in to work jointly with the Agency on his Lucifer modification. . . . NSA tried to convince IBM to reduce the length of the key from 64 to 48 bits. Ultimately, they compromised on a 56-bit key.
https://blog.cr.yp.to/20220805-nsa.html
> The cryptographic core of NSA's sabotage of DES was remarkably blunt: NSA simply convinced Tuchman to limit the key size to 56 bits, a glaring weakness.
> Whit Diffie and Marty Hellman wrote a paper explaining in considerable detail how to build a machine for $20 million that would break each DES key with an amortized cost of just $5000/key using mid-1970s technology. They predicted that the cost of such a brute-force attack would drop "in about 10 years time" to about $50/key, simply from chip technology improving.
> Diffie and Hellman already distributed drafts of their paper before DES was standardized. Did NSA say, oh, oops, you caught us, this isn't secure?
> Of course not. NSA claimed that, according to their own estimates, the attack was 30000 times more expensive: "instead of one day he gets something like 91 years".
The Diffie and Hellman paper from 01977 is https://ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/publications/27.pdf.
The main source here is https://archive.org/details/cold_war_iii-nsa/cold_war_iii-IS..., "American Cryptology during the Cold War, 1945-1989", DOCID: 523696, REF ID: A523696, a declassified internal NSA history. Longer version of the quote above, originally classified TOP SECRET UMBRA, from p.232 (p.240/271)
> (S CCO) The decision to get involved with NBS was hardly unanimous. From the SIGINT standpoint, a competent industry standard could spread into undesirable areas, like Third World government communications, narcotics traffickers, and international terrorism targets. But NSA had only recently discovered the large-scale Soviet pilfering of information from U.S. government and defense industry telephone communications. This argued the opposite case - that, as Frank Rowlett had contended since World War II, in the long run it was more important to secure one's own communications than to exploit those of the enemy.
> (FOUO) Once that decision had been made, the debate turned to the issue of minimizing the damage. Narrowing the encryption problem to a single, influential algorithm might drive out competitors, and that would reduce the field that NSA had to be concerned about. Could a public encryption standard be made secure enough to protect against everything but a massive brute force attack, but weak enough to still permit an attack of some nature using very sophisticated (and expensive) techniques? NSA worked closely with IBM to strengthen the algorithm against all except brute force attacks and to strengthen substitution tables, called S-boxes. Conversely, NSA tried to convince IBM to reduce the length of the key from 64 to 48 bits. Ultimately, they compromised on a 56-bit key.
This may sound like a paranoid conspiracy theory, but it is the point of view of an NSA insider, writing in 01998 for an audience of NSA cryptoanalysts and cryptographers to educate them on the history of cryptology during the Cold War. It is understandable that Schneier and others believed that the overall influence of the NSA on DES was to increase its security, because they did not have access to this declassified material when they formed those opinions; it wasn't declassified until July 26, 02013.
bonzini
a day ago
That's true, but the fact that NSA wanted to make brute force cheaper also suggests that they didn't have any particular offensive tricks up their sleeve (they had differential cryptanalysis but they used their knowledge defensively) like they did with Dual_EC_DRBG.
kragen
a day ago
Yes; also, if they had had such tricks, they probably would have mentioned them in that document, perhaps in a following paragraph that was censored from the declassified version. But there seems to have been no such paragraph, further supporting your inference.
greenavocado
3 days ago
Is there a more efficient way? What's the state of the art?
kragen
3 days ago
Only slightly more efficient, 2²⁵⁴·³: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard#K...
timschmidt
3 days ago
IDK, let's ask a mathematician. Oh, they all work for NSA.
aaronbrethorst
3 days ago
timschmidt
3 days ago
I like to tell myself that everyone at NSA is a fine upstanding patriot, and that the agency only ever does what is in the best interest of the American People, but that does feel naive at times. Like when they infiltrate international standards bodies to introduce backdoors.
Is downsizing the NSA something we're upset about?
akimbostrawman
3 days ago
It doesn't even really matter what character most of them have. Most information is on need to know basis for a reason so the one giving the orders can tell a tale about foreign terrorists while the grunts happily surveil the common man.
gosub100
3 days ago
Or when they walk out the door with gigabytes of secret data in their pocket.
bb88
3 days ago
If you can find a quantum computing solution it's at worst O(sqrt(n)).
There still seems to be a time factor, if not energy factor to computation.
Shor's algorithm for factoring prime numbers is at best O(log(n)^2 * log(log(n)))
k0ns0l
3 days ago
[dead]
nullc
3 days ago
Wrong assumption. Lets imagine they could costslessly crack the encryption there. But as soon as they use any information gathered that way they risk leaking that they have this incredibly valuable capability. ... valuable and very fragile since people can easily change encryption schemes.
Better to pay every party you need to to have boring vulnerabilities and security shortcomings, so that any information leak doesn't need a capabilities revealing explanation.
So I think this gives you no information on their capabilities beyond bribing commercial players, which isn't exactly new. In the past (and presumably now) our intelligence apparatus has outright owned crypto/security companies in order to distribute backdoored technology.
And of course they have, they're not prohibited, it's highly effective, they'd be incompetent not to.
bb88
3 days ago
But knowing still gives you an advantage, even if you can't use it legally -- because you can still use it illegally.
LEO and Prosecutors will use "parallel construction" to construct a narrative about how information was obtained in a legal way even though it was clearly obtained illegally.
Or you could choose to only act on 5% (e.g.) of the information gleaned -- and that which could clearly be shown to be leaked by a third party.
Or say if you were tapping the information of a mob boss, you could leak the information to a competitor and let justice work it's way through the streets instead of the courts.
nullc
3 days ago
It's tricky, because you run the risk that any use risks disclosing the capability. Targets can even set traps. E.g. I caught irc opers spying on PMs by sending trap URLs where I secretly could see the access logs. Because great care was taken to make sure the URLs existed nowhere else when they got loaded it was a confirmation that the traffic was monitored.
Now perhaps a somewhat safer tool is to just use the cracking to determine the best targets to bribe or backdoor, but only allow the group with the cracking power to give the names of services to monitor at any cost.
bb88
2 days ago
Well, I mean IRC is typically a cess pool these days. So there's a very high likelihood that something may be scanning urls you send across. DCC was a thing back in the IRC days of old, but CGNAT pretty much ended that.
I think what's most interesting along this lines is what happened during WWII when the allies cracked the enigma. Suddenly, they knew what the nazis were sending to each other. Bletchley Park had to keep most of the intelligence secret to itself, because the nazis could get wind of it and changes the procedures to encryption -- particularly if some top secret attack was somehow thwarted out of the blue.
That's why I said the part about "parallel construction". During WWII if the allies captured a spy or a high ranking officer, then they could maybe act on one piece of information -- giving the allies the necessary plausible deniability by blaming it on the captured nazi officer.
emmelaich
3 days ago
You could leak the private key accidentally on purpose but that would be harder to plausibly deny involvement if that fact leaked.
deafpolygon
3 days ago
I'm reminded of a certain XKCD comic[1]. The US government probably doesn't need to crack the encryption to get what they want.
CrossVR
3 days ago
I once asked a VP of engineering at a major ISP why they don't add a layer of encryption to their peering and customer connections to prevent spy agencies from tapping their fibre cables. I was expecting him to say it would be too expensive to upgrade all their network hardware given the amount of traffic. Instead he said: "our routers can already do that, but the government regulator stepped in and prevented us from turning it on."
rdtsc
3 days ago
That's pretty wild. Was it an "investment" of some sort, and then the CEO got a hint with a wink, that there is more where it came from if they don't enable any encryption. Anyone from Rovio who got less than $10m in their pocket willing to tell us a story?
xori
3 days ago
"How do you get corporate secrets out of a software engineer? Sit them next to another engineer on a plane."
frollogaston
3 days ago
It's elegant. The other person can spill amazing secrets, but there's no way to prove it, so nobody will believe you second-hand.
arealaccount
3 days ago
Why wouldn’t they just give them DB access for the 10m? Id assume NSA would prefer the database to remain encrypted and have an admin account?
radicaldreamer
3 days ago
Deniability
bb88
3 days ago
If you're the NSA, you can tell Amazon, "Hey here's $1B. You're going to get some fiber outages, and we're also going to buy a bunch of compute from you at an exorbitantly high price you'll charge us. It's fine, we're the NSA. So when the outages happen, don't announce it. Also terrorism."
dylan604
3 days ago
Plausible. You can always deny anything. It just might not be so plausible under scrutiny.
bb88
3 days ago
10M sounds like a nice executive bonus. I'm not saying it's a bribe -- I would never, ever do that.
user
3 days ago